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This paper analyses the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the development of local 
firms. We focus on two likely effects of FDI: a competition effect which deters entry of 
domestic firms and positive market externalities which foster the development of local 
industry. Using a simple theoretical model to illustrate how these forces work we show that the 
number of domestic firms follows a u-shaped curve, where the competition effect first 
dominates but is gradually outweighed by positive externalities. Evidence for Ireland tends to 
support this result. Specifically, applying semi-parametric regression techniques on plant level 
panel data for the manufacturing sector we find that while the competition effect may have 
initially deterred domestic firms’ entry, this initial effect has been outpaced by positive 
externalities making the overall impact of FDI largely positive in this country. 
 
Keywords:  Foreign direct investment, spillovers, industrial development, firm entry, semi-
parametric estimations 
 




* We are grateful to Forfás for the provision of the data.  We would also like to thank the participants at a 
research seminar organized by FEDEA (Madrid) for useful comments and especially Omar Licandro and Juan 
José de Lucio for very helpful suggestions. We also wish to thank Oscar Bajo, Lionel Fontagné, Jaqcues Mélitz, 
Patrick Messerlin, Frances Ruane and two anonymous referees for very useful comments on earlier versions of 
this work.  Holger Görg gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Leverhulme Trust under Programme 
Grant F114/BF and the European Commission under Grant No. SERD-2002-00077.  Eric Strobl is grateful for 
his Marie Curie Research Fellowship. I Introduction 
It is a well-known fact that foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have increased 
dramatically over the last three decades or so.  It is also undoubted that governments across 
the world, in developing and developed countries alike, are trying to attract multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) to locate in their country, using generous financial and fiscal incentives 
(see, for example, Hanson 2001).  The rationale for such enthusiasm displayed at attracting 
MNEs has been debated in the academic literature as well as in policy making circles.  One 
argument is that multinationals bring with them some sort of superior technology and that this 
will “spill over” to domestic firms, thus assisting them in improving their efficiency and, hence, 
productivity.  However, the vast evidence that has thus far been accumulated is less than 
conclusive on whether such spillovers do take place.  In fact, there are a substantial number of 
studies arguing that there are actually negative spillover effects, i.e., the presence of 
multinationals harms productivity in domestic firms due to increased competition.
1   
Even disregarding the issue of knowledge spillovers, there are other ways in which the 
entry or presence of MNEs may assist the development of host country firms.  In particular, 
multinationals’ demand for intermediate inputs, some of which will be sourced on the 
domestic market, can induce changes in the domestic industrial structure and can kick-start the 
development of local industry.  This is the issue with which we concern ourselves in this paper, 
analysing the impact of FDI on the development of local firms.   
In order to illustrate these arguments and motivate our subsequent empirical analysis 
we begin by presenting a simple theoretical framework in order to analyze the main 
mechanisms at hand.  We build on the existing theoretical literature concerning the potential 
  1impact of FDI, in particular, Markusen and Venables (1999), Rodriguez-Clare (1996) and 
Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz (1991).  The interaction between MNEs and domestic firms 
takes place through several channels.  The first one is the factor market, as FDI represents a 
capital inflow and modifies the host country capital endowment.  In addition, foreign affiliates 
use differentiated intermediate product which indirectly affects the production conditions for 
domestic firms.  The second channel is a competition effect, where MNEs are competing with 
local producers on their product market as well as on the factor market.  We show that the 
evolution of the number of local firms as a function of the presence of foreign firms can be 
depicted as a u-shaped relationship where the competition effect first dominates but is 
gradually outweighed by positive externality effects.  
We then analyze empirically the impact of FDI on domestic start-ups using plant level 
panel data for the manufacturing sector in the Republic of Ireland over the period 1972 to 
2000.  The Irish economy provides arguably a model example for such an analysis given that it 
is heavily dependent on multinational companies, which accounted for roughly one half of 
manufacturing employment in 2000.
2  More importantly, the presence of multinationals has 
had profound effects on sectoral adjustment in the Irish manufacturing sector. While 
indigenous manufacturing industry tended to initially be concentrated in traditional and food-
sector activities, MNEs have invested primarily in modern high-tech sectors, leading to an 
increase in the significance of the high-tech sectors for the Irish economy (Barry and Bradley, 
1997). 
Using the plant level data and applying semi-parametric regression techniques we find 
that the impact of FDI on domestic firms’ entry follows a u-shaped curve.  In other words, an 
                                                                                                                                                     
1 See, for example, Aitken and Harrison (1999) and Konings (2001) for arguments to that extent.  Recent studies 
finding positive spillover effects are, for example, Keller and Yeaple (2003) and Haskel et al. (2002).  See Görg 
and Strobl (2001) and Lipsey (2002) for surveys of the literature.   
  2increasing presence of multinationals may initially harm the development of domestic firms 
due to increasing competitive pressure.  However, after reaching a certain threshold value, the 
positive benefits of FDI outweigh the negative factors, hence fostering the development of 
domestic firms.
3   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  In the next section we describe our 
theoretical framework.  Section III outlines our empirical specification in order to test these 
predications and contains a description of our data.  Our empirical results are presented in 
Section IV.  Concluding remarks are provided in the last section. 
II Theoretical  framework 
In order to motivate our empirical analysis of the effects of FDI on local development 
this section builds a simple model to illustrate the main forces at hand.  In order to do so we 
draw on the literature on imperfect competition and intermediate linkages between industries.  
One of the main analytical tools used here is a transformation of the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) utility 
function into a production function.  As pointed out by Romer (1987), this allows capturing a 
preference for variety in intermediate inputs and, as a consequence, to consider increasing 
returns due to specialization.  This idea has been applied by, for instance, Rivera-Batiz and 
Rivera-Batiz (1991) to analyze the impact of FDI on host economies.  Using a simple general 
equilibrium model, they show how foreign capital entry may induce more specialization in 
services, which in turn has a positive effect on efficiency in related industries.   
                                                                                                                                                     
2 This is evident from our datasource, see also Table 1 below.   
3 There are a number of related empirical papers examining the effect of multinationals on the Irish economy.  
Ruane and Ugur (2002) find evidence for positive spillovers emanating from multinationals.  Görg and Strobl 
(2003) show that the presence of multinationals enhances the survival probabilities of domestic firms in the same 
industry.  The paper most closely related to ours is an earlier study by Görg and Strobl (2002) on the effect of 
multinationals on domestic firms.  While they find a positive effect, their study is limited in that it is not directly 
based on a theoretical model and that they do not allow for a potential non-linear relationship.    
  3The idea is fairly straightforward.  Consider an economy with two sectors of activity, 
services and manufacturing, both of which employ capital as primary input.  In addition, the 
manufacturing industry uses differentiated services as inputs.  Since there are increasing returns 
in services and competition is of the monopolistic type, an external entry of foreign capital 
makes available capital cheaper and average costs lower in the service sector.  If the number of 
firms in equilibrium (and the variety of differentiated services) is determined by a zero profit 
condition in the service sector, then lowering the average cost through foreign capital entry 
causes an increase in services variety.  This has, in turn, an indirect impact on the 
manufacturing sector as the number of services available in the economy increases the 
productive efficiency of manufacturing firms.   
However, this model has some limitations.  First, FDI is modeled only through foreign 
capital entry.  Second, competition in the manufacturing sector within which FDI occurs is 
supposed to be perfect while the general theory of FDI postulates that multinationals are more 
likely to exist in imperfectly competitive markets, see Hymer (1976), and, more recently 
Markusen (1995, 2002).  According to these latter contributions, multinationals own some 
advantages internalized through FDI against other possible strategies like exporting or 
licensing.  Recent studies, in particular Rodriguez-Clare (1996) and Markusen and Venables 
(1999) considered these elements in an explicit way to analyze the effects of FDI on host 
economies.  
In Rodriguez-Clare (1986) the impact of FDI on host economy industry depends on 
the input-output linkages multinationals generate compared to the linkages domestic firms 
would themselves generate.  When a multinational has a higher linkage coefficient than 
domestic firms this leads to a higher equilibrium variety of specialized inputs and this is thus 
beneficial to the domestic economy as whole.  However, Rodriguez-Clare (1996) does not 
  4explicitly discuss the way competition takes place between firm-types which can, arguably, 
condition the way FDI affect the local industry.   
Such a competition effect is explicitly analysed in the model by Markusen and Venables 
(1999).
4  Their results show that FDI may have two main effects on host economies: the 
linkage effect through intermediate demands as described above and the product competition 
effect through which multinationals may force domestic firms to exit the market.  However, 
their model suggests that, while multinationals can act as a catalyst to stimulate local industry, 
local industry and multinationals do not coexist.
5  One can, however, consider this result as 
particular case.  As noted by Markusen and Venables themselves, “this result comes from the 
relatively high degree of similarity between local and multinational firms, and it is easy to imagine circumstances 
which would permit coexistence” (1999, p.351). 
In what follows we build a simple model in which coexistence of domestic firms and 
foreign multinationals is possible.  Such a scenario may arguably be more general than the 
specific case considered by Markusen and Venables (1999).  In particular, this allows us to 
study the way competition and spillovers effects act successively through the entry of FDI.  
We do not consider the conditions under which the coexistence between domestic and foreign 
firms is possible, as in Markusen and Venables (1999).  Instead, we assume that FDI is 
determined exogenously and takes place both through the entry of new firms into the product 
market and of foreign capital entry as described by Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz (1991).  This 
is made possible by considering that FDI occurs through foreign capital entry as long as the 
return to capital in the host economy is higher than in the origin country.  In doing so, we 
                                                 
4 Haaland and Wooton (1999) have a similar theoretical setting, though they focus on the rationale for financial 
incentives. 
5 The authors argue that this case corresponds to the experience of some countries in East Asia where 
multinationals have served as catalyst for industrial development and, after a certain period of time, have been 
wiped out because of the strong competition they ended-up facing on their own product market. 
  5introduce a simple law of motion where FDI ceases when the returns to capital are equalized 
in both countries.  This allows us to describe the way competition and positive externalities act 
successively and how they can possibly influence the development of a local industry in which 
both domestic and multinational firms coexist.  
II.1 Structure of the model 
We consider an economy with three sectors: agriculture, which produces a 
homogeneous good y, manufacturing and services which produce differentiated goods x and s, 
respectively.  All sectors use a composite factor K which includes both labor and capital.  
Services are intermediate inputs in the production of the manufacturing good.  Consumers 
own K and purchase x and y and have identical preferences described by a utility function 
defined on y and on a sub-utility function defined on x.  The utility function of the 
representative consumer takes the form: 
δ δ − =
1 Y X U           ( 1 )  












j x X           ( 2 )  
where    and  j =1..n 1 0 < Γ < x , with nx being the number of varieties of the 
manufactured good.  
We assume monopolistic competition in manufacturing so that each variety of the 
manufacturing good is produced by only one firm.  Additionally, there are increasing returns to 
scale represented by decreasing average costs and manufacturers use K as a primary production 
factor and services as intermediate inputs.  Given r, the unit price of K, q, the price index of 
  6services, and xj , the production level of each producer taken individually the cost function of 
each manufacturing firm is defined by:
6 
( ) j j j x r q x C β α
µ µ + =
− 1 ) (        ( 3 )  
with 0 < µ < 1. 
The terms α and β are positive parameters and average costs are decreasing with 
production so that there are increasing returns to scale, specifically internal returns to scale.  The 
price index of services is defined as follows: 












i s p q         ( 4 )  
where i=1...ns  , and ns is the number of available varieties of differentiated services and 
σ is the constant elasticity of substitution between each pair of variety of differentiated services 
with σ > 1.  Assuming that all varieties of the differentiated services enter symmetrically in the 
production function, expression (4) can be simplified to 
i s s p n q σ − = 1
1
         ( 4 ´ )  
Equation (4´) depicts the relationship between q and ns .  Since the expression  σ − 1 1  
is negative, an increase in ns provokes a decrease in q.  The direct consequence is that the cost 
function of manufacturing firms defined by (3) decreases with ns for a given production level.  
This implies a potential external effect or external returns to scale of service sector activity on 
manufacturing because service variety, represented by ns, plays a positive role for 
manufacturing firm efficiency per se.  Given the specification of the utility function in (1) and 
                                                 
6 This is the cost function used by Venables (1996) and it can be easily derived from a Cobb-Douglas production 
function with a fixed component in term of services and the composite factor.  
  7(2), constant elasticity of substitution between each pair of differentiated manufactured 





θ   >   1          ( 5 )  
It can be shown that, for a sufficiently large number of firms, θ  is also the price 
















j f p q             ( 6 )  
Given θ , individual prices are determined by the equalization of marginal income to 
marginal costs.  Prices are set above marginal cost and using (3) and (5) we can find the 








r q Pj           ( 7 )  
There is free entry and exit in manufacturing implying zero profits.  Using (3) and (7) 
one can find the expression for the quantity produced by each manufacturing firm as a 
constant term equal to: 
β
θ α ) 1 ( −
= j x          ( 8 )  
This represents the break-even level of production or, in other words, the production 
level to be reached by each manufacturing firms to cover fixed costs. 
There is monopolistic competition also in the services sector so prices and quantities 
can be derived using the same assumptions as above.  In addition, as in Markusen and 
Venables (1999), we assume that services are non-tradable.  The cost function is the same for 
each service producer and is equal to: 
) ( ) ( i i i s r s C ρ γ + =         ( 9 )  
  8where si is the production level of each service firm i and γ  and ρ are positive constant 
terms.  Average costs decrease with si  so that there are increasing returns in the service sector. 
Hence, firm behaviour is similar in the service and manufacturing sector.  Given σ,  the 
constant demand elasticity between each pair of services, individual prices are set above 
marginal costs.  Services are only used by manufacturing firms but not by consumers.  With a 
sufficiently large number of service varieties, σ can be taken as the price elasticity of demand, 





=        ( 1 0 )  
As in manufacturing, there is free entry and exit in the service market so that profits 
equal zero in equilibrium.  Using equations (9) and (10) we can derive the break-even level of 
output in services as: 
ρ
σ γ ) 1 ( −
= i s          ( 1 1 )  
Finally, equilibrium in the agricultural sector is quite simple.  Since y is the production 
level of the agricultural good and there is perfect competition, the production function for 
agriculture can be represented by an aggregated function as: 
y K y =         ( 1 2 )  
where Ky is the total quantity of composite factor employed in agriculture.  The price of 
the agricultural good is equal to marginal cost: 
r py =           ( 1 3 )  
The description of the model is completed with equilibrium in the composite factor 
market.  Using Shephard’s lemma to derive demand for capital by manufacturing and service 
  9firms from equations (3) and (9) respectively and from equation (12) for agriculture, it is 

















       ( 1 4 )  
K is the total endowment in the composite factor of the economy and the second 
partial derivative of the left hand side is defined taking pi as given and Ky is the total factor 
employed in agriculture.   
One can now use the model to analyze the relationships between the service sector and 
the manufacturing industry.  To simplify the analysis, we examine first the closed economy 
case and show afterwards how FDI may modify the results and play an active role for the 
development of local firms. 
II.2 The closed economy case 
The interactions between service and manufacturing firms work through two channels, 
namely, the factor market and the upstream-downstream production structure.  To consider 
interactions in the factor market, one has to bear in mind that all sectors use the same factor.  
Following Krugman´s (1979) framework, the equilibrium number of firms in services and 
manufacturing is determined by the size of the market, i.e., the total endowment of K in the 
economy.  Hence one can use equation (14) to derive the first relationship between the 
equilibrium number of firms of both sectors as follows.   
Since the utility function depicted in equation (1) has a Cobb-Douglas form, the 
expenditure on the agriculture good equals: 
rK y py ) 1 ( δ − =         ( 1 5 )  
With full employment, the term rK is equal to the available income destined for 
consumption of agricultural and manufactured goods.  Then (1-δ) rK is the value of income 
  10available for consumption of the agricultural good.  Using equation (13) one can show that the 
demand for the composite factor in agriculture is equal to 
K Ky ) 1 ( δ − =        ( 1 6 )  
The term δK represents the total quantity of the composite factor employed in the 
service and manufacturing sectors.  We can then use equation (14) together with equations (3) 
and (9) for the cost function, and equations (4´), (8), (10), and (11), which give the equilibrium 
values for prices and quantities, to determine the equilibrium number of manufacturing firms 
as a function of the parameters of the model, the number of services firms and the total capital 
endowment of the economy 
σ
µ

















n        ( 1 7 )  
Equation (16) shows that nx is greater, the larger is K .  Here the equilibrium number of 
firms in the service sector ns , acts on nx through two opposite effects.  The first one is positive 
and plays through the externalities effect since a larger number of varieties in the service sector 
implies a lower price index for such services as described in equation (4´) and increases 
manufacturing firms’ efficiency.  This is because the exponent µ/(1-σ) of ns in the denominator 
is negative, a rise ns provokes a rise of nx.  The second one is negative since a higher number of 
service firms implies also a higher demand for K which increases the price of capital ceteris 
paribus, playing against manufacturing firms efficiency.  There is then competition on the factor 
market which limits the equilibrium number of firms in the two different industries as these 
firms use both K factor.  The general relationship between nx and ns is thus ambiguous 
although one should note that both are affected positively by a larger endowment in K.   
  11Finally one can derive the number of service firms by using the equilibrium condition 
on the service market.  We assume that each service enters the production function 
symmetrically.  One can then use the cost function for manufacturing firms given by equation 
(3) to determine the total demand for intermediate services multiplying individual demands by 
the equilibrium number of manufacturing firms.  We can use Shephard’s lemma to derive 
individual demand for each service variety.  Since the individual supply of each service is fixed 
at the break-even level of production given by equation (11), the demand for each service 










         ( 1 8 )  
III.3  Multinationals in the model 
In order to introduce MNEs into the model we need to make two important 
assumptions.  First, we assume that there is a continuous entry of new firms in the market.  
Second, we assume that FDI is the only way to penetrate the local market.  FDI occurs 
through firms located outside the host country ignoring the production and competition 
conditions in their home market.  The entry of foreign firms is then determined by the 
differential in the price of r  between the host market and the home market (r*), namely, ∆nm > 
0 if r > r* and ∆nm = 0 if r ≤  r*.  With r > r*, foreign firms enter the market until r = r*.  The 
number of local firms is then endogenous in the model while the number of MNEs is directly 
determined by the relative value of r and r*.
7   
It then follows that the entry of foreign firms in the local market is accompanied by an 
exogenous entry of the foreign composite factor K.  The amount of K transferred by each 
                                                 
7 Note that in order to make the analysis more tractable we still assume that for MNEs, like domestic firms, 
output level is set in order to get zero profit. In addition, we assume that all services consumed by MNEs are 
produced locally by firms from the service sectors. 
  12multinational is represented by a constant term Φ.  This entry of the additional factor exerts 
indirectly a positive effect on domestic firms since it increases K.  As such, the potential 
negative impact of an increase in demand for production factors represented by a larger 
number of firms is lowered through a larger endowment in capital which increases the variety 
of services available in the economy.  This also captures the positive macroeconomic effect of 
a larger capital endowment in the host economy, as in Rivera-Batiz and Rivera-Batiz (1991). 
In addition we assume that MNEs have the same cost function compared to their local 
counterparts and we can use equations (7) and (8) to determine the equilibrium level of prices 
and quantities as before.
8  The number of multinationals is represented by nm and the number 
of local firms nl , which are our two main variables of interest.  Given that all firms within each 
type are identical we can rewrite equation (6) as the price index for the manufacturing product 
including multinationals: 
{} θ θ θ − − − + = 1
1
1 1
m m l l f p n p n q            ( 1 9 )  
This equation shows, as in Markusen and Venables (1999), that multinationals will exert a 
competitive pressure on domestic firms by lowering the price index of the final product. The 
entry of multinationals reduces domestic firms’ sales and drives some to exit the market in 
order to fulfill the zero-profit condition. 
Conditions remain equal in the service sector and conditions for equilibrium depicted 
in the previous section remain unchanged.  We can then rewrite equations (14) and (18) by 
considering the entry of MNEs and the modification of K to represent the magnitude of FDI 
and to determine the equilibrium number of local firms in manufacturing and service sectors.  
This leaves us with two expressions to determine: the equilibrium condition for full 
                                                 
8 Note that this assumption is not crucial and one could perfectly imagine cases where production cost differ 
between each firm-type. The results remain fundamentally the same, however. 
  13employment in the capital market and the equality between demand and supply of individual 
services.  Both equations are derived taking the equilibrium values for prices and quantities as 
before.  After some calculation, the equilibrium in the capital market is given by: 














   (20) 
where   represents the proportional change in the capital endowment of the host 
economy due to FDI.  The term Φ represents the variation rate at which K changes.  Given 
that we assume that domestic firms and multinationals have the same cost functions the 











+         ( 2 1 )  
Using the expression of the cost function and the equilibrium level of each service production, 























m l s n n n      ( 2 2 )  
Equations (20) and (22) have no straightforward interpretation, however, and one has 
to rely on numerical simulation in order to analyze the mechanisms at hand. The first 
mechanism is represented by the positive externality arising from the increase of K by an 
amount that we have supposed to be proportional to the number of MNEs.  The second 
element is that an increase in the number of active firms in the market increases the demand 
for intermediates and provokes externality effects through the relationship between the 
equilibrium number of manufacturing and services firms.  However, the last element can also 
play against the equilibrium number of local firms.  An entry of MNEs increases competition 
and, ceteris paribus, provokes the exit of a determined number of local firms to restore zero-
  14profit given the break-even level of output.  There are thus several elements working 
simultaneously making the analysis quite difficult.   
To illustrate how the way model works we construct a numerical example using 
equations (20) and (22).  The result is represented in Figure 1.  The u-curve represented in this 
figure depicts the potential effect of FDI on the number of local firms in the host economy.  
This effect is first negative meaning that first the competition effect of FDI dominates.  Entry 
of new foreign firms, although they have higher fixed costs than local firms, provokes the exit 
of a determined number of local firms.  This is in part due to our hypothesis concerning the 
way in which FDI occurs.  The entry of multinationals then forces some domestic firms out of 
the market through competitive pressure.  However, for further increases of nm , the 
equilibrium number of local firms starts to increase as a result of the dominance of the positive 
externalities effect.  Moreover, since we have considered successive changes in the capital 
endowment of the economy, the competition effect begins to be less important relative to the 
larger market reflected by a larger factor market and, as a consequence, a larger market for final 
consumption.   
[Figure 1 here] 
It is important to mention the particularity of our hypothesis.  Taking FDI as both an 
entry of new firms in the market and as a capital inflow it causes ns to increase monotonously.  
Consequently, FDI always has a positive effect on intermediate services variety.  The potential 
benefit for domestic firm then lies in the relative strength of this positive externality and of the 
competition effect as described earlier in the model. Perhaps more interestingly, Figure 1 
shows that the potential positive effect of FDI is more important than the negative.  When 
  15positive externalities from FDI dominate, the number of local firms ends up being higher than 
initially, in the equilibrium without FDI.
9   
III  Empirical Specification and Data 
III.1 Empirical Specification 
We take the prediction of a u-shaped relationship between FDI and domestic firms as 
a guide for our empirical work.  However, in order to provide empirical evidence we need to 
slightly depart from the theory in two main ways.  Firstly, the theory considers the number of 
MNEs as the crucial variable.  However, that does not take account of the empirical fact that 
multinationals are generally much larger than domestic firms (e.g., Barry and Bradley, 1997 for 
Ireland).  Hence, in order to measure the importance of multinationals in an industry we 
measure the presence of multinational enterprises by the share of employment in MNEs, as is 
commonly done in the related recent literature (see, e.g., Keller and Yeaple, 2003; Görg and 
Strobl, 2003).  Nevertheless, we also experiment in our empirical analysis with using the share 
of total plant numbers as  a proxy for foreign presence. 
Secondly, the theory predicts a relationship between the number of MNEs and the 
number of domestic firms.  However, rather than examining the absolute number our 
empirical approach is to look at the rate of entry of new domestic firms.  This allows us to 
focus on the effect of fostering or discouraging new entry while at the same time scaling entry 
relative to the total number of firms in the industry.  Furthermore, it places our paper firmly 
                                                 
9 Other numerical examples could have been considered here.  For example, if local firms are relatively less 
efficient than MNEs (i.e. for a α sufficiently lower for multinationals than for domestic firms), FDI may provoke 
the exit of all the local firms.  Efficiency is then a key determinant making local firms able to capture potential 
spillovers arising from FDI.  A more complete model would also include the balance of payments equilibrium to 
determine the potential effect of FDI on local wages and welfare; however, this is not the focus of our analysis 
here and is therefore not pursued.   
  16into the tradition of entry models in empirical industrial organisation (e.g., Acs and Audretsch, 
1989; Mata, 1993).   
Hence, our empirical implementation of the theoretical relationship amounts to 
estimating the following relationship 
Ejt = α + g(FSjt) + γ Zjt + uj + vt + εjt     ( 2 3 )    
where the dependent variable is the net entry rate defined as the number of indigenous 
plant entries minus exits over the period t to t+1 divided by the total number of plants at time t 
in industry j, uj is a sector (three digit NACE Rev 1) specific term, vt is a year specific effect, 
and εjt is the remaining error term, assumed to be independent across sectors and over time.  Z 
is a vector of time and industry varying covariates, namely the sectoral growth rate (SEGR - 
measured in terms of three digit industry employment growth), industry size (ISIZE - 
measured as total employment in the industry), minimum efficient scale (MES - measured as 
average plant size), and average age of plants in the three digit industry (AGE).  The inclusion 
of these is motivated by empirical studies of firm entry (e.g., Mata, 1993; Mata and Machado, 
1996; Görg and Strobl, 2002)   
FS is our proxy intended to capture the effect of foreign multinational companies on 
the entry of new firms.  As discussed above, it is calculated as the share of employment in 
foreign-owned plants, i.e., employment in foreign plants divided by total employment in 
industry j at time t.  One should note, that we do not restrict it to be linear, but to be of some 
function g(.).  Our theoretical model suggests that it should be u-shaped. 
III.2 Data 
Our plant level data source is the annual Employment Survey collected since 1972 by 
Forfás, the policy and advisory board for industrial development in Ireland, and we have 
  17access to this data up until and including the year 2000.  The response rate to this survey is 
estimated by Forfás to be generally well over 99 percent, i.e., our data can be seen as including 
virtually the whole population of manufacturing firms in Ireland.  Information at the plant 
level include the nationality of ownership, level of employment, and the sector of production 
of each plant.  Forfás defines foreign firms as firms which are majority-owned by foreign 
shareholders, i.e., where 50 percent or more of the shares are owned by foreign shareholders.  
While arguably, firms with lower foreign ownership should possibly still be considered foreign 
owned, this is not necessarily a problem for the case of Ireland since almost all foreign direct 
investment in Ireland has been greenfield investment rather than acquisition of local firms; see 
Barry and Bradley (1997). 
Table 1 and 2 provide some aggregate data averaged over several years pertaining to 
the net entry rate of indigenous plants and the share of employment in foreign multinationals 
as a percentage of total employment in the two digit (NACE Rev 1) industry, respectively.  As 
can be seen, the net entry rate of indigenous plants has fluctuated considerably over the years.  
In aggregate, it reached a high of a little over 9 percent in the late 1970s, but has been steadily 
decreasing since the late 1980s. Examining individual sectors reveals considerable variability 
across these, where the high entry rates in the more high-tech sectors are particularly notable. 
The aggregate series concerning foreign presence in Table 2 reveals that multinationals have 
been steadily increasing their importance in the Irish manufacturing sector.  More precisely, 
foreign multinationals accounted for some 33 percent of manufacturing employment in the 
early 1970s, and this share has risen to around 47 percent by the end of our sample period.  
Again, however, the data in the table show that there are considerable sectoral differences, 
where foreign presence has been generally lower in the traditional sectors. 
[Tables 1 and 2 here] 
  18It is worth pointing out one important aspect of multinationals in the Irish economy, 
namely, their being predominantly export oriented.  While our data set does not contain 
information on exports, studies by Ruane and Sutherland (2002) and Barry and Bradley (1997) 
find that foreign multinationals, in particular from non-EU countries, export over 90 percent 
of their total output in the 1990s.  This picture was similar at the beginning of our sample 
period, with McAleese (1977) showing that US multinationals exported 95 percent of sales, 
while British and German owned affiliates had export ratios of 82 percent in 1974.
10  Hence, 
one may expect there to be little competition between foreign and indigenous firms on 
domestic product markets, with the competitive pressure working mainly through factor 
markets. 
Section IV: Econometric Results 
IV.1 OLS Estimator 
In order to estimate the impact of foreign presence on entry of domestic firms we first 
proceed using simple OLS and including foreign presence and its higher order values.  Results 
of this using foreign presence defined in terms of share of employment are depicted in Table 3.  
Restricting FS to a linear impact we find it has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
the net indigenous entry rate, in line with the findings by Görg and Strobl (2002).  However, 
estimating (23) without FS, regressing the subsequent residual on FS, and then employing a 
Ramsey test suggests that a simple linear effect may not be correctly capturing the required 
functional form.  We thus proceed and include a quadratic term, but this renders the linear 
term insignificant and a Ramsey test still suggests that the specification is unsatisfactory.  While 
including a third order term does result in all FS variables being significant, a Ramsey test still 
                                                 
10 The current high export ratios are frequently attributed, at least in part, to Ireland’s being an EU member.  In 
the earlier years, multinationals locating in Ireland could benefit from an export tax holiday, explaining the high 
  19suggests misspecification.  Moreover, the inclusion of fourth and fifth order terms, as shown in 
the last two columns, suggests that the relationship between the net indigenous entry rate and 
foreign presence is not easily modelled by the shape restrictions that come with using higher 
order terms.  We also conduct a similar exercise using the share of foreign plants in total plant 
population within a sector as a foreign presence proxy, as shown in Table 4.  Here, similarly, it 
is difficult to judge from the higher order terms and the Ramsey tests what proper functional 
form FS should take.   
[Tables 3 and 4 here] 
IV.2 Semi-Parametric Kernel Regression Estimator 
A more flexible and perhaps more attractive approach to further investigate the 
possible non-linearity of the relationship between E and FS in (23), while also allowing for the 
(linear) effect of other conditioning variables Z, follows the semi-parametric methodology 
proposed by Robinson (1988) using the Kernel regression estimator.
11  Specifically, this 
estimator does not, in contrast to including higher order terms, impose any restrictions on the 
relationship of interest.  Accordingly, one can consider the following equation to be estimated: 
Y  = α + g(X) + δZ + u        (24) 
where Z are a set of explanatory variables that are assumed to have a linear effect on  y ~ (= 
), g() is a smooth and continuous, possibly non-linear, unknown function of X, and u is 
a random error term.  A commonly used non-parametric estimator of an unknown function 
like  g(X) without allowing for the effect of other conditioning variables is the Nadaraya-
Watson estimator (see Nadaraya, 1964 and Watson, 1964): 
y log ∆
                                                                                                                                                     
export ratios.  See Ruane (1991) for a detailed discussion of Irish industrial policy.   
11 See Blundell and Duncan (1998) for details and a helpful discussion of the implementation of this method. 
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such that i=1…n are the n number of observations, Kh() is the shape function, commonly 
referred to as the Kernel, that is a continuous, bounded and real function that integrates to one 
and acts as a weighting function of observations around X and depends on the choice of 
bandwith h.   
The appeal of this estimator lies in its very flexible approach to non-linearity by 
allowing the relationship of  y ~ with respect to X to vary over all values of X.  Specifically, this 
technique corresponds to estimating the regression function at a particular point by locally 
fitting constants to the data via weighted least squares, where those observations closer to the 
chosen point have more influence on the regression estimate than those further away, as 
determined by the choice of h and K.  An additional appeal of this sort of technique is that it 
avoids any parametric assumptions regarding the conditional mean function m(X), and thus 
about its functional form or error structure.   
Allowing for the linear effect of other explanatory variables only slightly complicates 
the estimation of g(X).  Specifically, Robinson (1988) showed that in controlling for other 
conditioning variables the (semi-parametric) Kernel regression estimator for g(X) simply 
becomes:
12 
() () ( X m X m X g X y ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ~ δ − = )
) )
         ( 2 6 )  
where   and m  are the (non-parametric) Kernel regression estimates of E( ( X my ~ ˆ ( X X ˆ y ~X) 
and E(ZX), and δˆ  is the OLS estimator of: 
                                                 
12 The fact that δ is in part estimated using OLS makes this a semi- rather than non-parametric estimator. 
  21() () () ε δ + − = − X m Z X m y X y ˆ ˆ ~
~         (27) 
where  ε  is a random error term. Intuitively,  ( ) X g ˆ  is the estimate of g(X) after the 
independent effect(s) of Z on Y has been removed. 
Given that the estimate of  ( ) X g ˆ  is at least in part based on non-parametric estimation 
techniques, one cannot subject it to the standard statistical type tests (e.g. t-test) that 
economists have grown so accustomed to using in parametric regressions.  One can, however, 
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where cαcK is a kernel specific constant corresponding to the α quantile of the distribution and 
 is defined as:  ( X
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n         ( 2 9 )  
One should note that (29) ignores the possible approximation error bias of  ( ) X g ˆ . 
Including this in (29) would complicate the expression considerably since the bias is a 
complicated function of the first and second derivatives of g(X).  This bias tends to be highest 
at sudden peaks of   and at the necessarily truncated left and right boundaries of the data. 
However, if h is chosen proportional to 1/n
() X g ˆ
(1/5) times a sequence that tends slowly to zero then 
the bias vanishes asymptotically for the interior points.
14  For all our estimations we use a 
Gaussian kernel for Kh and an optimal bandwidth h such that: 
                                                 
13 See Haerdle (1990) for details.   
14See Haerdle (1990) and Wand and Jones (1995) for a discussion of these aspects. 




h =            ( 3 0 )  
where m = ( (interquantile range) () × X
2 ˆ σ X / 1.349) 
One should also note that the size of  ( ) X
2 ˆ σ  at any point of X will depend 
proportionally on the marginal distribution of X. In other words the accuracy of the estimate 
of g(X) at X is positively related to the density of other observations around that point.  In 
order to visualize this effect we, as suggested by Haerdle (1990), calculate the pointwise 
confidence bands at points chosen according to the distribution of X. Specifically, we chose 
points so that five per cent of the observations lie between them.
15   
Our semi-parametric kernel regression estimates of g(x) along with pointwise 
confidence bands using the net entry rate as the dependent variable and foreign share of 
employment as the measure of FDI presence are given in Figure 2.
16  One should also note 
that we do not report the actual estimates of g(FS)  on the vertical axes, just graph the 
relationship between FS and the dependent variable.  Our primary reason for not reporting 
these is that our estimates of g(FS) are predicted values from which the influence of the other 
control variables have been purged, and hence, cannot be directly linked to the actual range of 
observed the net indigenous entry rate. Instead, as is standard, one should use the figures to 
gauge the estimated slope of the relationship in question. Of course, it is this relationship that 
the is paper is concerned with in any case. 
As can be seen, we find a u-shaped relation ship between the net entry rate and foreign 
presence within a sector, although this is not continuously smooth.
17  Nevertheless, the size of 
the confidence bands shows that the curve is estimated with considerable confidence, except 
                                                 
15 From the endpoints we chose the 1 and 99 percentiles of the distribution. 
  23for higher values of FDI presence where also the distribution of observations is relatively 
small, as indicated by the horizontal width between each confidence band.   If our estimate of 
g(FS)  is taken at face value, then the minimum of the curve is found where FDI presence takes 
the value of 29 per cent.  Thus the competition effect of FDI outweighs any positive spillover 
effects on net indigenous plant entry up until this point, but once this threshold level of 
reached positive spillover effects dominate.  This evidence, thus, is in line with the patterns 
suggested in the theoretical analysis in Section II.   
  We also estimated the model using the share of multinationals in total plant population 
as a proxy for FDI presence and present the results in Figure 3.   First of all one should note 
that the observations near the maximum value of FDI in our data (0.8) are very sparsely 
distributed, so that estimates are likely to be poor.  This is at least in part probably part of the 
reason for the curve’s wide fluctuations near the right boundary.  The rest of the curve is 
similar to that for foreign employment share, although the turning point is somewhat earlier, 
namely around 23 per cent.   
[Figures 2 and 3 here] 
  One should note that the semi-parametric Kernel regression estimator can be 
extremely sensitive to outliers given that it is roughly speaking simply a local weighted average 
of the response variable.  This is already apparent from the greater width of the confidence 
bands around peaks and near the right hand side end points where there are fewer 
observations.  In order to check for the robustness of the shapes implied by the overall sample 
we re-estimated our regressions excluding what may be ‘outliers’.  Specifically, we excluded all 
observations where the net entry rate was one standard deviation above or below the sample 
                                                                                                                                                     
16 Given that values on the vertical axis for the net entry rate are based on predicted values and thus do not 
correspond necessarily to the actual observed entry rates, we have omitted labeling the axis rather than shifting 
the value by some constant to fall within the range of actual values. 
  24mean.  For the foreign share of plant population regression we also excluded all observations 
where the share was above 0.6, since Figure 3 seems to suggest a number of poorly estimated 
peaks to the right of this value.  The kernel regression estimates for these sub-samples for 
foreign presence measured in terms of employment and in terms of plant population are given 
in Figures 4 and 5, respectively.   
[Figures 4 and 5 here] 
Accordingly, in terms of employment share there still exists a general u-shaped 
relationship, although, given that a large part of the right hand side has been truncated, this is 
not as pronounced as for the unrestricted sample.  Clearly, however, the depicted curve 
suggests that at low values of foreign presence there is a competition effect, while the overall 
trend beyond a value of 0.2 is upward sloping, indicating positive spillovers.  For the plant 
population curve, as shown in Figure 5, the u-shaped link between net indigenous entry and 
foreign presence similarly remains, although perhaps not as pronounced as for the full sample. 
V Conclusion 
This paper examines the effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the entry of local 
firms in host economies.  In our theoretical framework we show that the impact of FDI on 
local development depends on two countervailing forces: first, a competition effect which 
provokes the exit of local firms; second, positive market externalities related with foreign 
presence which foster domestic firms’ start-up.  With a continuous flow of FDI, the evolution 
of the number of local firms can be depicted as a u-curve where the competition effect first 
dominates but is gradually outweighed by positive externalities effects.  Taking this as a 
motivating framework for our empirical analysis and applying semi-parametric regression 
                                                                                                                                                     
17 Using a larger value of h could ensure greater smoothness, but the trade-off is a greater approximation bias.  
  25techniques on plant level panel data for the manufacturing sector in the Republic of Ireland, 
we find support for such a u-shape.  
Our results have important implications for economic policies pursued in host 
countries.  This concerns questions such as incentives for resources transfer with FDI. Our 
model shows how FDI can be positive for local firms expansion and that positive externalities 
are more likely to occur the larger is the amount of capital transferred through FDI and the 
greater is the efficiency of local firms. We also show that local firms need to adapt to new 
competitors since FDI represents a greater competition factor than imports due to the factor 
market size limitation. FDI may provoke the exit of a given number of local firms while the 
remaining firms will be able to capture the positive spillovers effects related to FDI.  This 
implies a transition period in which the competition effect dominates.  In this case policy may 
be aimed at shortening this period and smoothing the transition process by assisting domestic 
firms to improve their capacities in order to be able to compete with multinationals.  Thus, 
policy could be aimed at increasing R&D and innovative activity, as well as training of workers. 
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  28Table 1:  Domestic Entry Rate Five Year Averages 
 
NACE NAME  1972-1977 1977-1982 1982-1987 1987-1992 1992-1997 1997-2000
15 Food  5.3 3.8 6.8 5.9 5.3 4.5 
16  Drink & Tobacco  3.3 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 19.4 
17 Textiles  5.6 8.8  15.4  9.1 5.5 2.6 
18  Wood and Wood Products  5.2 6.6  10.3  11.7  5.3 3.1 
19 Clothing  6.4 5.9 9.1 6.5 4.6 4.1 
20 Leather  Products  8.1 9.1 6.4 4.2 3.8 2.6 
21  Paper and Paper Products  6.4 9.8 7.4 7.2 5.1 3.3 
22  Printing and Publishing  7.1 5.7 3.9 3.6 3.4 3.2 
23  Coke and Petr. Pr. & Nuclear F.  0.0 6.7  17.6  4.7 0.0 0.0 
24  Chemicals and Chemical Prod.  7.2 7.7  12.2  7.9 5.3 6.5 
25  Rubber and Plastic Products  7.2 12.2  10.1 7.6  5.9  3.3 
26  Other Non-Metallic Minerals  7.0 7.9 9.2 5.2 3.6 2.8 
27 Basic  Metals  8.5 13.4  11.2 8.5 10.8 4.6 
28  Fabricated Metal Products  8.7  13.0  8.5 4.8 3.0 2.9 
29  Machinery and Equipment NEC 10.5  13.5  6.0 9.8 5.7 5.3 
30  Office Machiner and Computers  18.3 28.4 23.2 13.3 13.0 10.1 
31  Electrical Machinery   9.1 15.4  12.6 7.3  5.7  5.7 
32 Electronic  Equipment  6.1 21.6 8.1  9.5 12.5 9.3 
33  Medical and Precision Instr.  14.7 13.2 12.9  9.4  9.0  9.6 
34 Automobile  Products  5.9 8.5 5.1 4.1 2.7 2.1 
35  Other Transport Products NEC  7.3 6.8  10.0  5.6 5.3 5.1 
36 Furniture  8.2 13.0  11.2 7.3  7.9  5.3 
37  Other Manufacturing NEC  --- --- ---  50.0  0.0 --- 
ALL   7.0 9.1 8.9 6.7 5.3 4.3 
 
 
  29Table 2:  Foreign Presence Five Year Averages 
 
NACE NAME  1972-1977 1977-1982 1982-1987 1987-1992 1992-1997 1997-2000
15 Food  28.7 28.6 29.1 29.1 26.5 24.7 
16  Drink & Tobacco  64.1 57.7 59.4 61.0 75.5 75.5 
17 Textiles  41.2 53.7 57.1 59.6 59.3 52.0 
18  Wood and Wood Products  21.2 23.9 33.2 35.6 31.7 28.6 
19 Clothing  27.1 31.0 25.5  7.9 13.1  13.8 
20 Leather  Products  10.0 7.4  7.7  9.4 9.0  13.5 
21  Paper and Paper Products  29.0 28.9 31.9 32.1 27.8 21.9 
22  Printing and Publishing  8.4 7.7 6.8 7.0 8.8 8.8 
23  Coke and Petr. Pr. & Nuclear F.  28.3 27.6 21.9 19.7 17.6 19.3 
24  Chemicals and Chemical Prod.  58.0 70.5 75.7 79.0 81.5 82.4 
25  Rubber and Plastic Products  42.2 47.4 45.7 44.9 42.5 40.8 
26  Other Non-Metallic Minerals  22.3 23.1 23.6 23.0 20.3 15.8 
27 Basic  Metals  75.6 68.3 69.5 65.0 55.4 46.2 
28  Fabricated Metal Products  33.4 27.2 23.8 26.9 26.6 25.5 
29  Machinery and Equipment NEC 51.0 55.6 57.7 55.7 50.1 48.5 
30  Office Machiner and Computers  86.9 97.0 94.4 90.1 90.6 92.7 
31  Electrical Machinery   33.0 50.4 62.2 67.4 69.4 66.9 
32 Electronic  Equipment  44.5 56.1 72.7 77.9 82.5 82.4 
33  Medical and Precision Instr.  81.4 86.3 86.9 86.4 86.2 85.1 
34 Automobile  Products  70.9 69.5 69.2 78.1 77.0 71.0 
35  Other Transport Products NEC  49.7 43.5 26.7 32.4 45.2 50.9 
36 Furniture  13.9 16.9 15.5 16.8 19.6 16.5 
37  Other Manufacturing NEC  ---  ---  ---  58.3 62.5  --- 
ALL   33.8 37.6 40.8 43.8 45.7 47.1 
 
  30Table 3: OLS Estimation Using Foreign Share of Employment 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
FS 0.190***  -0.015  0.505*** -0.162  0.471 
 (0.035)  (0.091)  (0.184) (0.325)  (0.476) 
FS2   0.233**  -1.326***  2.226  -3.375 
   (0.095)  (0.489)  (1.510)  (3.420) 
FS3     1.132***  -4.840**  11.874 
     (0.349)  (2.426)  (9.473) 
FS4       3.148**  -17.027 
       (1.266)  (11.127) 
FS5         8.495* 
         (4.655) 
MES 0.000*  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
AGE 0.004**  0.004**  0.004** 0.004**  0.004** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
SEGR 0.150***  0.149***  0.150*** 0.149***  0.149*** 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) 
ISIZE -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant 0.119  0.124 0.120 0.123  0.126 
 (0.198)  (0.197)  (0.197) (0.197)  (0.197) 
Observations 2530  2530  2530  2530  2530 
F-test 5.19***  5.21***  5.27*** 5.29***  5.28*** 
Ramsey Test  3.76***  5.00*** 7.27*** 7.22***  7.76*** 
R-squared 0.22  0.22 0.22 0.23  0.23 
Notes: (1) Time and Industry Dummies included. (2) Standard errors in parentheses. (3) ***, **, and * are 1, 5, 
and 10 per cent significance levels.  
 
  31Table 4: OLS Estimation Using Foreign Share of Plant Numbers 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
FS 0.565***  -0.213  0.577** 0.016 -0.514 
 (0.057)  (0.136)  (0.236) (0.417)  (0.650) 
FS2   1.280***  -2.054**  2.076  7.831 
   (0.203)  (0.843)  (2.661)  (6.040) 
FS3     3.398***  -5.985  -27.931 
     (0.833)  (5.795)  (21.475) 
FS4       6.561  40.867 
       (4.010)  (32.571) 
FS5         -18.723 
         (17.641) 
MES 0.000***  0.000***  0.000*** 0.000***  0.000*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
AGE 0.001  0.002  0.003*  0.003  0.003 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) 
SEGR 0.152***  0.149***  0.149*** 0.149***  0.149*** 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) 
ISIZE -0.000***  -0.000**  -0.000** -0.000**  -0.000** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant 0.067  0.090 0.094 0.090  0.089 
 (0.195)  (0.193)  (0.193) (0.193)  (0.193) 
Observations 2530  2530  2530  2530  2530 
F-test 5.86***  6.21***  6.33*** 6.31***  6.27*** 
Ramsey Test  8.41***  2.15** 1.96*  0.99 1.84* 
R-squared 0.24  0.25 0.26 0.26  0.26 
Notes: (1) Time and Industry Dummies included. (2) Standard errors in parentheses. (3) ***, **, and * are 1, 5, 
and 10 per cent significance levels. 
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  33Figure 2: Net Domestic Entry Rate – Share of Total Employment by Foreign Plants 
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  34Figure 3: Net Domestic Entry Rate – Share of Total Plant Population by Foreign 
Plants 
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  35Figure 4: Net Domestic Entry Rate – Share of Total Employment by Foreign Plants – 
Without Outliers 
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  36Figure 5: Net Domestic Entry Rate – Share of Total Plant Population by Foreign 
Plants 
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